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# **West Europe Report**

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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## RISING OPPOSITION IN CHURCH GROUPS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Apr 81 pp 19-21

[Article: "Meek Crusade--Federal President Carstens and Chancellor Schmidt Are Alarmed--On Top of It All, Opponents of Nuclear Weapons Are Forming a New Anti-Bonn Opposition in the Churches"]

[Text] "Don't be afraid" is the motto the Protestant prelates have coined for their flock coming to attend the 19th German Protestant Lay Conference in Hamburg in June. Yet Christians that are afraid are going to dominate the congress.

Fear of nuclear death and armament has caused thousands of Protestants to join a large number of new peace groups. Holding the Sermon on the Mount in their hands, with pastors in the lead, they march against Pershing and Poseidon. The meek shall inherit the earth, they say, recalling the charter of Christian pacifists, and they that take the sword shall perish by the sword.

At the Hamburg conference, according to estimates by church experts, as many as 75 such groups will agitate against NATO and counterarming, arms mania and military service. Dietrich Sattler, spokesman of the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) says: "Peace will be the dominant subject in Hamburg".

As recently as a year ago, Protestant Military Bishop Sigo Lehming still dismissed the pacifist commitment of his coreligionists as a "play of ignoramuses", but now church leaders and politicians feel they must meet the challenge of the new crusade of the meek.

It is impermissible, Protestant Karl Carstens preached at Saint Peter's Church in Bremen Easter Sunday, for individual pastors to put forth their political opinions "with a claim to Christian truth". And it is a "particularly dubious matter", the federal president said, for Christians to base their demand for unilateral disarmament on the Sermon on the Mount.

Some weeks earlier, Helmut Schmidt, a coreligionist of Carstens, had put it even more clearly. In contrast with the stand by the head of state, the chancellor ruled out any interference by the churches in politics, for which he said he alone was responsible to God and his own conscience. He suspected Protestant peace fighters had a "certain inclination toward accepting the sentence 'Rather Red than dead'" and accused them of supporting a "naive moral philosophy".



Roman Herzog, minister of the interior in Stuttgart and chairman of the Protestant Working Group of the CDU/CSU, too, is observing the peace debate in the churches "with concern". And CDU Bundestag Deputy Willi Weiskirch detected an old archenemy among the antiwar Protestants, stating indignantly that the church youth was "ranging itself alongside communists" in agitating for refusal of military service as an important contribution to peace.

It is a quite secular concern that unites the strange grand coalition of fit-to-fight Christians, from the CDU's Carstens to the SPD's Schmidt--the fear that it may become exceedingly difficult to put over NATO counterarming in the face of growing citizens' protests. Even now leftists and Greens, veteran pacifists and Alternativists are demonstrating jointly against nuclear arms for Europe. They greatly welcome the push from the churches.

Daily these happy-go-lucky people report new support. Up and down the country, with pastors in the lead, new little groups form in the parishes--such as the Peace Initiative for Genuine Security and Effective Disarmament in Russelsheim, the Church Group Initiative "The Church Unilaterally for Peace" Altdorf in the Palatinate, a Parsons' Initiative in Gladbeck and the Disarmament Initiative of Bremen Church Parishes in Bremen. EKD Council Deputy Chairman Helmut Hild comments: "The number of such groups is very great, and their activities are strong".

There is some stirring among the Catholics as well. Critical Sponti groups, in a motley combination of staunch theology professors, frustrated pastors and lay circles at colleges and in parishes dissatisfied with the basic restorative trend of their church, have discovered the antinuclear movement as what Harald Pawlowski, editor-in-chief of the journal PUBLIK-FORUM, calls "a second leg to stand on". At the 1980 Berlin Catholics Congress, leftists within the church for the first time gathered signatures for "Christians against nuclear armament".

What prompted the surge of Christian pacifists is the debate about the neutron bomb and counterarming, but also disgruntlement about politicians and parties. Stuttgart parson Hermann Schaeufele says: "The 30-year-old verbal struggle must be converted into action". According to the calculations of his working circle "To Live Without Armament" (ORL), presented in a leaflet for the benefit of the lay conference, "more than 6,000 official disarmament talks have taken place, and virtually nothing has been accomplished".

With a radical pacifist program, ORL within 3 years has managed to become the largest of the new peace groups in the Protestant Church. Fascinated by the utopia of a peaceful life without arms, of nonviolent defense on the pattern of Mahatma Gandhi, 15,300 Christians have taken the following pledge: "I am prepared to live without the protection of military armament; in our state I want to support the political development of peace, without arms".

In the Stuttgart office of the group, according to parson Werner Dierlamm, "10 to 20 new signatures" arrive daily. Meanwhile 50 ORL regional groups are organizing resistance throughout the republic with weeks of fasting and weeks of peace, information booths and debates. Inspired by their success, the radical

pastors hope for "a broad base of all those" who "as Christians and politically thinking persons are ready to turn around" (Schaeufele).

As yet, however, their attempt to do business with parties and unions has met with little success. Even SPD leftists like synodalist Erhard Eppler are very fussy. He says that the slogan "To Live Without Armament", "understandable though it is, cannot produce any political result whatsoever, because it is not capable of a majority".

Others are all the more anxious for the new allies from the church. Rudolf Bahro, gatherer of any unorthodox leftists and of Greens, at the Second Socialist Conference in Marburg last fall called for support of the ORL parsons. He says: "The ecological movement is the soundboard of the new peace movement, and I want to participate in the effort of bringing the forces together".

There is still a great deal to be had in the churches. In the fall of 1980 the Sign-of-Conciliation Action supported by the EKD received the endorsement of tens of thousands of Protestants and Catholics when in 350 places in the Federal Republic it called for the first nationwide week of peace. Its slogan: "Create peace without arms!"

Having sent volunteers into Israeli kibbutzim or to tend to memorials at Auschwitz and Majdanek since 1958, this organization is already preparing its next mass demonstration scheduled for November. And at their next meeting in September, the critical church groups organized in the "Catholics Conference From Below" since the Berlin congress plan to make counterarming their main topic.

In the fall, SPD federal executive manager Peter Glotz predicts, an "organizational climax of the peace movement" will be reached.

The traditional peace groups of the churches too have been given a boost by the wave of pacifism:

--The official Catholic peace movement Pax Christi, for long years an association marginally tolerated by the official church strictly programmed for military service, of late has been joined primarily by socially committed university graduates and priests. "The members in our 70 base groups are getting younger and younger", says Secretary General Reinhold Lehmann.

--The German section of the International League of Conciliation, with a membership of 100,000 pacifists of all denominations worldwide, is being courted at its federal convention this year by well-known Greens and citizens' initiative people such as Petra Kelly and Roland Vogt.

--The German Conciliation League chairman, Pastor Konrad Luebbert in Uetersen, together with the veteran pacifist Martin Niemoeller collected 10,000 signatures for his "Christians for Disarmament" action.



--The "Historical Churches of Peace" of the Quakers and Mennonites gathered in "Church and Peace" support the ORL. Their development aid service, Eirene, plans to lend stronger support to domestic actions against armament.

Protestants wanting to create a counterpole in their church so far have not been able to equal the successes of the pacifists.

Eberhard Stammler, editor-in-chief of EVANGELISCHE KOMMENTARE, had to be content with 500 signatures when he tried to drum up support for "insuring peace". His key sentence: "To maintain the balance of military strength is therefore indispensable to the extent which is needed to make any political act of violence an incalculable risk".

Another group of Christian peace researchers and journalists want to take a middle road between such traditional attitudes and radical pacifism. As agreed at a closed meeting in Ludwigshafen late in January, they plead for a disarmament initiative beginning with "carefully thought out unilateral measures of disarmament" while maintaining an "adequate nuclear deterrent capacity" for the time being.

They are supported by EKD Vice Chairman Helmut Hild, who says: "The time has come when there is a need for certain calculable renunciations in going along with the configuration of balance in order finally to break the vicious circle".

Hild's chairman on the council, Eduard Lohse, however, does not want to take such an unambiguous stand. In the individual churches, from Kurhessen-Waldeck to Berlin-Brandenburg, from Lippe to Baden, officially established working groups for a start are trying to absorb the pressure from the base.

And in the EKD's Chamber for Public Responsibility, Lohse has 25 theologians and church leaders, politicians and social scientists work out a new framework of rules on how the militant Protestants are to demean themselves in regard to defense and arms. The 1959 "swing formula" (Pastor Heinrich Albertz), it turns out, to the effect that service in times of peace can be carried out both with and without arms, does not appear adequate any longer even to some Protestant leaders for calming their church flock.

Already hopes are stirring among pastors and flock that by the time of the fall synod in Fellbach the church brain trust will produce a paper of the quality of the East memorandum in which the church will side with the disarmers.

Yet the church leaders are not inclined to place too much trust in their chamber, where the thinking is done by such different people as Erhard Eppler, CDU planner Richard von Weizsaecker and FDP lady Liselotte Funcke. An EKD official comments skeptically: "The higher our expectations, the deeper will be the hole into which one will fall".

Some of those falling in, the SPD would like to catch. Else it will have to fear that in peace policy, of all things, more and more adherents will abandon their support for it.

SPD leftist Karsten Voigt is already pondering publicly the "credibility crisis" of SPD-FDP disarmament policy. And Schmidt opponent Eppler replied brusquely to the chancellor's wholesale criticism of church peace groups, saying: "It particularly ill becomes Social Democrats to try to silence parts of the Protestant Church who helped to put over Willy Brandt's peace policy when they express doubts about today's peace policy".

Meanwhile the Social Democrats take the peace movement seriously enough, particularly among the Protestants, to plan to work out new key values regarding security policy even before the lay conference in Hamburg, at a closed meeting of the party executive in mid-May. The party's executive manager, Glotz, has announced a "great dialogue with an 'Alternative' security policy", saying that "the SPD wants to play a greater role in the peace movement".

Whether the latter will let it do so remains to be seen. "Incalculable advance concessions" prior to disarmament talks, let alone the forgoing of all armament, Glotz has rejected a priori.

Self-confident and in a proper Christian manner, pacifist pastor Hermann Schaeufele assesses the chances of a dialogue with the SPD saying: "We do not give up on anyone".

8790

CSO: 3103/299

## PARTY SPOKESMEN GIVE VIEWS ON TNF STATIONING

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 29 Apr 81 p 3

[Text] The decision about the Netherlands' position regarding modernization of Euro-strategic weapons which the Van Agt cabinet only wants to make next December, places a heavy burden on the next cabinet formation. That again appeared clearly during the forum discussion held yesterday evening about Netherlands foreign policy in the next cabinet term, which was organized by the Netherlands Association for International Affairs.

Each of the four major parties had assigned their foreign affairs specialist: Bolkenstein, VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]; Brinkhorst, D'66 [Democrats '66]; Mommersteeg CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and Van der Stoel, PvdA [Labor Party]. Their respective positions are partly diametrically opposed to each other and are in another respect just as indefinite as in December 1979, when a majority in the Second Chamber decided to postpone for 2 years a final decision on the NATO modernization resolution.

Van der Stoel considers it inconceivable to proceed with TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces] negotiations without the United States ratifying the SALT II Treaty.

The December 1979 agreement to test the results of armament control discussions in 1981, therefore is still undecided. There is nothing to test. Consequently the PvdA does not think it is right to make a final decision in December.

The CDA is divided. Mommersteeg personally thinks that a decision must be made in December and that a second postponement, as Prime Minister Van Agt recently suggested, is a bad idea. However, Mommersteeg admitted that a consensus is not appearing in the CDA.

According to Bolkestein, restoration of the military strategic balance is a condition for armaments control discussion. Consequently the VVD regards the decision for modernization as not subject to question. In the VVD's opinion, it is settled in the NATO agreement for stationing 572 new weapons systems.

Brinkhorst wants to keep open the opportunity to renegotiate the NATO decision as such, although it is not clear where that will lead.

D'66 wants the Netherlands to be involved in NATO policy, both nuclear as well as conventional. A definite condition for Brinkhorst is that the United States make a concrete proposal regarding the armaments control discussion.

8490

CSO: 3105/135

## FINNISH-SWEDISH VENTURE SIGNALS START OF NORDIC ENERGY PLAN

Helsinki: HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 14 Mar 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] In the comments on the session of the Nordic Council in Copenhagen, an expanded cooperation on energy has been asked for as the backbone of the Nordic cooperation in the eighties. The start has been made in the Kvarken area which will now be given the go-ahead for an ambitious project, involving the production and use of solid fuel, says Ernest Granskog in today's editorial.

Vasa city's closest neighbor on the other side of Kvarken, the Umeå municipality, is just in the middle of planning a new thermal power station. The plant is designed for peat as energy source, the annual consumption is estimated at 1.5 million cubic meters. It is not yet completely clear how the raw material supply will be arranged in the long run. The neighboring municipality, however, expects to secure a not inconsiderable portion of the consumption through import of peat from Finland. The power plant will be equipped with a furnace for solid fuel, which will cost approximately 30 million kronor. The amount includes an additional cost of approximately 9 million kronor, as the cost of a conventional oil burner is 21 million kronor. Umeå expects the Swedish state to step in and pay the difference. The inevitable added cost of transition to solid fuel will thus be a burden which will be shared by others than the taxpayers of the municipality. If the supply of peat should run out, the furnace may be fired with coal.

The new thermal power plant at Umeå is one of many examples to show that a new time with new valuations has arrived, as far as the energy supply is concerned. Another example is the Schauman factories at Jakobstad, which, this week, announced that the company has decided to build a new steam boiler plant for domestic fuel. Schauman's investment is on a large scale. It is estimated at 200 million marks, 21.4 million marks of which will be contributed by the state. The plant is scheduled to start operation in early 1983.

All the bark, sawdust and other combustible waste which previously was literally being piled up, will, in the future, be converted into wood powder--a process which makes the enterprise a pioneer in this area in Finland. The venture,



which, as late as during the first energy crisis in the late fall of 1973, had hardly yet obtained the go-ahead, today meets the requirements for a good investment. The company expects to reduce the annual need for oil by 46,400 tons, or from 30 percent today to 5 percent, after the plant has been put into operation.

When Schauman announced the news, Magnus Wangel, local manager, formulated an opinion which deserves to be repeated: "It simply does not make sense for us each year to transport large quantities of wood waste from our plants to a pile which has reached above the tree tops, and instead receive tankers with costly oil for the same area," was his apt remark.

Examples of the efforts to reduce our dependence on oil may today be obtained from practically every corner of the Nordic countries. Even if the debate at the session of the Nordic Council in Copenhagen did not leave much space for the subject this time, it may, on the basis of earlier Nordic discussions, be established that there is wide agreement among the energy policies of the Nordic countries. All of the Nordic countries have embarked on the difficult job of taking up and developing a new technology which it is hoped, in the long run, will make the bills for the oil imports unendurable for the economy. By reducing their use of oil, the industries may find the necessary means for increased competitiveness which they sorely need. If oil, in the future, becomes considerably more expensive than what it already is, and, as is well-known, the prognoses are in this respect unfavorable, the efforts for a gradual transition to domestic energy sources appear extremely wise.

The wide agreement in Sweden and Finland that the countries must make themselves less dependent on oil thus represents a resource which has not yet been fully exploited. It, therefore, is the more gratifying that the Nordic Government Officials Committee on Regional Policy (nMrp) has just confirmed that means will be made available which will make it possible, in 3 years, to complete one of the previously started projects in the Kvarken area, which, among other things, aims at an expanded industrial cooperation between the Vasa and Vasterbotten counties on production, use, and processing of solid fuel.

The prelude to the new project was made at a conference in 1980 arranged by the Kvarken council on peat and wood-chips as the energy source of the future in the Kvarken area. Symbolically, a big question mark was attached to the theme of the conference which it has probably not yet been possible to wipe out completely but whose sharpest contours already now are less concise than when the conference was called.

The ambitions are at this stage aimed at preparing new information material on peat and wood-chips as tomorrow's leading energy sources, in broad cooperation among business enterprises and with the expertise of, among others, technical universities and Nordic research and fact-finding bodies. As target group for this information, approximately five hundred decision-makers and key figures in municipalities, energy authorities, business enterprises and regional bodies and mass media have been selected. After the continuous exchange of information and transfer of knowledge has started, a subsequent stage will be the planning of concrete research efforts for development of peat and wood-chip business organizations and the distribution to small-scale pilot projects, such as greenhouses, agriculture, and residential areas.



It is impossible, at this stage, to predict to what extent the energy supply in the Kvarken area will have to be revolutionized as a result of the new cooperation. On the basis of the broad support which the project has already received, and with a view to the already now existing good technical preparedness and the supply of raw materials existing on both sides of the Kvarken, the prospects that the research efforts will give the desired results are good. Nordic cooperation modelled on modern times may have a worse framework than this.

7262

CSO: 3109/149

## LAMBSDORFF GIVES DETAILS OF NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Apr 81 p 13

[Article by Ho/K.B.: "Lambdorff Explains His Structural Program"]

[Text] Bonn, 23 April--On Thursday Minister for Economics Graf Lambdorff explained the new structural program to the Central Bank Council of the German Bundesbank in Frankfurt. In conjunction with the Bundesbank policy of high interest rates, this program, the funds of which are to be raised on international capital markets--as argued with the French government--led to dissension between Chancellor Schmidt and the Bundesbank management. Lambdorff, who had traveled to Frankfurt to represent FRG Minister of Finance Matthoefer who had taken ill, made a valiant effort before the start of the session on DEUTSCHLANDFUNK to refute the differences in opinion. The minister stated that the new credit program when provides reduced interest rates particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises was not a matter for disagreement between the chancellor and Bundesbank President Poehl.

Lambdorff announced that the effective interest rate for these loans will be around 9.5 percent. In other words, these credits will be approximately 2 percent below the normal interest rate for business loans. It is still to be decided whether the loans will be issued at 100 percent or at a discount. This matter as well as other details will be discussed next Friday between the FRG Ministry of Finance, the Ministry for Economics and the credit institution for reconstruction charged with the implementation of the program. Some of the final decisions are planned for next week. Bonn expects that the final announcement will be made of the allocation criteria and the structure of the program next week. Until then authorizations for budget obligations will also have been established; presumably they will amount to DM 100 million annually. They are to cover interest subsidies.

According to the existing agreements between Bonn's ministries and the credit institution for reconstruction, the following structure of the program became apparent: Criteria for the size of the favored enterprises are to be based on sales. Accordingly, enterprises with sales of up to DM 50 million annually will be able to take out loans at favorable interest rates for two-thirds of their planned investments. Enterprises with annual sales between DM 50 and 200 million will benefit from reduced interest rates for as much as one-half of their

investments. Even larger firms will be able to get lower rates for as much as one-fourth of their credit needs. In addition to this "arrangement in three steps", a simpler "two-step arrangement" is also under consideration, according to which enterprises with annual sales of up to DM 50 million could receive favorable treatment for two-thirds of their investments, and all larger enterprises would enjoy the same for one-half of their investments.

CSU Deputy Theo Waigel, the economic policy spokesman for Bonn's opposition, challenged the Federal Government on Thursday to remove immediately the "chock blocks" that were interfering with the credit program and to announce the promotional guidelines. The economic signals were still on "red". Unfortunately the program had only been conceived in rough outlines and it had been announced to the public "too hastily" without the necessary consultations with the Brussels Commission, the Bundesbank and the Frankfurt credit institution. Even the Bundestag budget committee had not yet been familiarized with the details. It was "improper": first big words and later the deeds.

During the session of the Central Bank Council of the German Bundesbank in Frankfurt, current questions concerning monetary and interest policies were also discussed. The Bundesbank announced that no resolutions had been passed affecting credit policies. Therefore, for the time being, special lending rates and open market operations will remain the essential instruments of the Central Bank policy.

Furthermore, the German Bundesbank did not mention whether "courtesy" had been restored between the government and the Bundesbank concerning the raising of funds in the amount of DM 6.3 billion for the credit institution for reconstruction. It is possible that the Bundesbank repeated the well-known reservations which had previously been presented in Bonn by Bundesbank President Poehl, particularly when it comes to the reproach concerning a shadow budget and reduced interest rates for loans.

The question of "courtesy" toward the Bundesbank during this session may also have been circumvented because it has not yet been resolved whether the raising of the funds by the credit institution for reconstruction comes under article 20 of the Federal Bank Law. Apparently they did not want to dwell on it, realizing the fact that legal disputes might only strain the atmosphere. Perhaps the government also wanted to eliminate the risk of receiving a negative vote from the Central Bank Council.

8991

CSO: 3103/297

## POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Paris LE MONDE in French 2, 3 Apr 81

[Article by Michel Boyer and Bernard Brigouleix: "Belgium Becoming Impoverished"]

[2 Apr 81 pp 1, 3]

[Text] Belgians are still rich, but Belgium itself is becoming dangerously impoverished. Its national debt is such that some Belgians see the shadow of IMF experts looming in the lobby of the Palais de la Nation, the seat of government. "The same as in Zaire," is the shocked comment heard in the plush boardrooms of major banks. "As in England," we could retort, inasmuch as the process of "Britanizing" the Belgian economy appears to have actually begun.

The Belgian "sickness"--as it is conventionally called by employing a figure of speech comparable to the one formerly used to label as "miracles" various instances of exceptional economic growth in Belgium or elsewhere--displays three alarming symptoms: unemployment affecting one-tenth of the labor force, an internal budget deficit representing more than 10 percent of GNP, and an external accounts imbalance nearly equal to 5 percent of GNP (approximately 4 trillion Belgian francs).

The Belgian economy's weakness is all the more surprising because that peaceful country conjures up images of prosperous comfort and still ranks as one of the world's leading countries in per capita wealth--fifth, according to the OECD--even though this average does mask appreciable differences between various classes of Belgians. This time the aforementioned symptoms of weakness are prompting prognoses of bankruptcy. And yet these symptoms are in keeping with Belgium's history and structures, the gravity of the "sickness" having simply been revealed and aggravated by the world economic crisis.

Awareness of the phenomenon came belatedly. In fact, it came at a time when the situation was beginning to deteriorate more rapidly and appeared liable, therefore, to reach a point where political authorities could no longer control it. Because they were entangled in the long-drawn out language dispute, these authorities could not--or would not--detect the "fault lines," the existence of which Belgian society itself wished to deny. Now that the country is waking up to the truth, neither the political system, somewhat reminiscent of [France's] Third Republic, nor an unfinished regionalization program, can offhand provide the effective ways and means of halting a downtrend basically due to the country's "deindustrialization."

## Obsolescence

Since 1975, Belgian industry has lost one-sixth of its wage earners, and the commerce and services sectors despite their substantial--though somewhat parasitic--growth, have been unable to absorb this heavy drain. In fact, the country is handicapped by the obsolescence of its production and export structures that are ill-adapted to changing world demand. This obsolescence was masked during the 1960's and early 1970's by the retention--within a euphoric international climate--of certain advantages, such as the low cost of energy, a plentiful money market, a pool of skilled and relatively cheap manpower, and also the famous "social (labor-management) agreement." Now that these assets have diminished or disappeared, Belgium is denuded.

The downward slide began some 6 years ago at a time when international competition in domestic and foreign markets was increasing. Belgium, which is really not a high-technology country, found itself in a particularly poor position to cope with Third World nations, mainly because of the rising wage costs of its production. Thus, in very recent years, foreign firms that had established themselves there, in number and in force, to take advantage of initial benefits and incentives, have either moved out of the country, or so rationalized their investments that they no longer create new jobs or may even eliminate some. Generally speaking, Belgian firms have reached the end of the gains in productivity which the price of money had compelled them to make.

After the shutdown of its coal mines, Belgium also suffered a decline in its steel, textile, and shipbuilding industries, three sectors that had long been the strong points of its economy. Officials in Liege told us: "Wallonia is becoming one gigantic Lorraine." Since 1978, that region's steel industry has lost nearly 200,000 jobs and is shortly going to suffer further drastic cuts.

Difficulties cumulate in a country that has a population of only 10 million but is a large consumer of raw materials and energy, virtually all of which it has to import, even though the effects of a modest nuclear power program are beginning to be felt. Belgium has nearly 400,000 jobseekers receiving unemployment benefits, a figure that ranks it first among European countries hard hit by the economic crisis, even though Belgian standards for measuring unemployment are broader than in other EEC countries. In addition to the fact that women--one-third of the labor force, but two-thirds of the unemployed--and younger workers are the hardest hit, it should also be noted that there is a sizable number--approximately 130,000--of "fictitious" workers serving as "temporary special staff" in government departments and agencies as trainees.

## A Half-Million Unemployed

This total army of a half-million unemployed, real or "occupied," is a heavy financial burden on the government. The overall deficit--operating budget and capital budget of the central government, local governments, and social security--although once traditional, has now become alarming, having risen to nearly 500 billion Belgian francs. To finance it, the government has been borrowing from available capital, the holders of which are all the more disposed to lend their money because interest rates are high. All of this is detrimental to business and



Industrial firms whose investments are currently below their 1975 level. This tapping of domestic capital has been insufficient, however, and last year the Belgian Government had to resort to foreign borrowing totaling approximately 150 billion francs, a measure that was definitely an innovation.

Another new aspect of this overall picture is the external deficit, one more factor of indebtedness. This deficit is growing to such an extent that it currently totals some 200 billion francs. Belgium now has to borrow to pay its debts. This process has in turn produced a lack of confidence in the Belgian franc which the National Bank, the guardian of monetary orthodoxy and large gold reserves (1,330 tons), has thus far wanted to maintain within the tight limits of the European Monetary System and in the sphere of the mark. Now that the Belgian franc is under attack, this strict policy obliges the National Bank to spend huge sums to bolster the franc and compels it to raise its discount rate very substantially.

This has thus created a gap between the discount rate and the relatively low inflation rate of about 8 percent. In a country so dependent on foreign trade, a country which, in a way, has the appearance of a huge assembly and processing industry that must import in order to export, the maintenance of a strong franc has helped moderate price increases, an especially important point in that Belgium has a system of wage indexation.

But with the accumulation of imbalances that reinforce each other, the "virtuous circle" is no longer virtuous. Protection of the franc's par exchange rate now has a high social and economic price inasmuch as this protection has not been combined with a restrictive budgetary policy, a diversified industrial policy, and an active employment policy. As a result, some firms have been doomed although they could eventually have had a chance. Conversely, outright abandonment of such protection would result, sooner rather than later, in loss of the country's competitive edge, an edge which, it must be added, cannot be taken for granted in view of the new international division of labor.

Cutting this Gordian knot will not be easy. To be effective, the task of putting the economy back in good working order requires almost simultaneous action on all fronts: cutting public spending so as to reduce the burden the government imposes on the economy; adjustment of the franc's par exchange rate and easing of indexation regulations so as to make the currently rigid procedures more flexible; wage restraints and changes in the financing of social security; but also implementation of concrete industrial projects and vigorous action to eliminate large-scale tax evasion.

The economic situation is deteriorating so rapidly that without such a plan, Belgium, having used up a large amount of its capital, could be engulfed by depression and inflation, despite the fact that it still holds some trump cards. Admittedly Belgium did not take cognizance of its bleak economic situation until late 1980, but the measures taken thus far have been patchy, to say the least, and reflect primarily the imperatives of the country's political makeup or the desires of the National Bank. In a country where obtaining a consensus is now somewhat of a ritual, is the Belgian art of compromise compatible with the definition and implementation of a coherent strategy?



[3 Apr 81 p 9]

[Text] "This government had already been dead for months and was the only one not to realize it." This comment by Herman de Croo, leader of the Liberals ousted from the cabinet last fall, accurately summarizes an opinion quite widely held in the Belgian capital. In submitting his government's resignation to the king on 31 March, Prime Minister Martens could hardly have flattered himself that he was surprising anyone. Belgians were more astounded by the fact that he had managed to defer for so long this step which over the years has become one of the most established rites of Belgian political life, its natural punctuation. When the governmental "conclave" on 22-23 March granted the cabinet another reprieve after reaching agreement on a plan for very sharp spending cuts, this news was greeted with some relief, although the general feeling was that the reprieve would likely be short-lived.

Ostensibly, the situation is quite simple. Martens asked his government to approve a new series of economic measures, including an at least partial wage freeze and certain changes in the price index. His coalition government's socialist wing turned the measures down. This was, in short, a classical clash between right and left on a well-known issue, namely social policy, and beyond that, the effort to solve the economic crisis. A Social Christian cabinet minister commented with relative relief: "For once, this clash does not involve our never-ending inter-community quarrel."

Though this was ostensibly the situation, in reality, Martens, when submitting his resignation, had undoubtedly not only drawn the logical conclusions from the way his government was stymied by the disagreement between Socialists and Social Christians over the economic strategy to be followed. He also probably felt duty bound--or in a position?--to force the coalition government's four parties to clarify their intentions and assume their responsibilities, in other words, start restoring some internal order.

As a matter of fact, in the view of many politicians, the Martens government's major stumbling block is the split in the two large political parties that have made up that coalition government ever since the departure of first the "linguistic parties" and then the Liberals. Belgian public life has long been plagued by the feud between Flemings and French-speaking Belgians. It now appears to be plagued mainly by internal dissensions that are splitting both the Socialist and Social Christian parties. It is true that these disputes are not unrelated to the linguistic divisions, even though they do not correspond exactly to them. Indeed, when Andre Cools resigned his chairmanship of the French-speaking PSB [Belgian Socialist Party], he nearly failed to secure the election of his "heir apparent," the moderate Guy Spitaels, who received only 52 percent of the votes. Cools explained that "this was mainly the addition of contrary expressions of dissatisfaction." Perhaps. Yet the PSB's leftwing is becoming increasingly critical of the leadership, and lately there has hardly been any governmental course of action that has found favor in the eyes of these dissenters, even though Socialists were closely associated with these actions. "The party is, nevertheless, not prepared to venture to become an opposition party," said Cools just before the government resigned. Yet some highly insistent voices were heard within its ranks, and even more so within the Flemish Socialist ranks, pressing for a critical

reappraisal of not only of Prime Minister Martens' economic and social policy but also the country's major diplomatic and military policy orientation, particularly with regard to NATO.

Chairman Tobback of the Flemish PS group in the House of Representatives explained: "Our solidarity is primarily socialist. The distinction between French-speaking and Dutch-speaking party-members is secondary."

#### Trade Unionism and Social Welfare

But one does not have to press BSP (Flemish Socialist Party) leaders very much to notice that the linguistic cleavage with their own friends reappears very quickly. These leaders find it difficult to forgive certain Socialist French-speaking elected officials for having allied themselves with such relatively "hard-line" regionalistic movements as the Walloon Rally and the Democratic Front of French-Speaking Residents of Brussels. Flemish Socialists, perhaps because they represent a region which has an overall image that is politically more rightist and socially more bourgeois than Wallonia, readily consider themselves to be more to the left and more idealistic than their French-speaking counterparts.

Disunity is not the prerogative of the Socialists, far from it. There are divisions as well among the Social Christians, divisions that for months have been responsible to no small extent for complicating and distorting normal political interaction. If really necessary, one may chalk up to profit and loss those divisions between certain "luminaries" of the Social Christian family. With more satire than irritation, Brussels keeps books on the "petty verbal pokes" they take at each other, and on how Tindemans or Vanden Boeynants feel about their successors. But the so-called "Christian Democratic" wing of the PSC [Social Christian Party, French-speaking section]--and to a lesser extent, of the Flemish CVP [Social Christian Party]--has also very frequently grumbled about the constraints of governmental solidarity and the preponderance of Tindemans' friends, although this moderate wing does have several representatives among the prime minister's close personal associates.

The "Christian Democrats" insist on maintaining good relations with the powerful Christian trade unions, and, like the Socialists, are at times afraid that the government, in an effort to counter the recession, might take measures that would jeopardize a social welfare system that is exceptionally comprehensive and, as such, imposes a very heavy burden on public funds.

A Flemish Socialist leader explained: "Basically, we could work much better with the progressive elements of the Social Christians within a left-of-center government. Or then Tindemans and the rightwing of the PSC and CVP could follow a distinctly conservative policy with the Liberals, and we would be a sort of "Laborite" opposition. What everyone finds so difficult is to want to govern together at any cost." Contrary to the lofty national motto--which admittedly has already been wrenched more than once--in unity there is currently no longer any strength.

The resignation submitted Tuesday by Martens appears even to be a warning in this regard: in wanting to bring into the government the main elements of the Belgian political and social spectrum so as to cope more effectively with the economic

crisis [line(s) missing] through intermediary parties, the two major labor federations, were we not trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, and by seeking national unity, were we not running the risk of simply causing general paralysis?

This major handicap was coupled with another disadvantage related to the prime minister's very personality. No one or almost no one in the Belgian political community disputes the fact that Prime Minister Martens is obviously an intelligent, honest, hard-working, and cultured person. He is, however, clearly quite uncomfortable when dealing with economic matters, and this makes him more vulnerable to the successive and contradictory demands of the social partners [labor and management] and pressure groups. There is almost unanimous agreement, however, that his qualities made him just the man to try to resolve the intercommunity crisis with more chances of success than others.

Did he succeed? At first glance, we would be tempted to answer "yes." Passage of the regionalization laws of 8 and 9 August 1980 with the brief cooperation of the Liberals--who were "thanked" [dismissed] without too much consideration that very fall--unquestionably calmed the atmosphere. Everyone estimated that nothing was really settled. According to Xavier Mabille, director of the Center for Research on Social and Political Institutions, "by juxtaposing Flanders, the French community, and the Walloon region, and by deferring any decision on the very complex case of Brussels, the government above all institutionalized the differences without finding a common legal framework for them." Many political and administrative developments are still possible, but the highly emotional climate surrounding intercommunity issues has, nevertheless, abated.

The economic and social crisis apparently did the rest. Public opinion shifted its concern. But Tindemans speculated: "Was the concern in question really that of public opinion or of the politicians?" Many are somewhat relieved that attention has at last been turned to the "real problems," namely the economic issues.

It remains to be seen whether, in fact, efforts to solve the economic crisis are not reintroducing the eternal confrontation between Flanders and Wallonia through a roundabout way other than the legal and cultural dispute. Wallonia is for the moment harder hit by the recession than Flanders. Moreover, the Flemings appear to be grumbling more and more about the imperative social and economic demands of national solidarity.

### "Two Conceptions of Society"

In this connection, it is highly significant to note how many Flemish officials, still "unitarists" a short while ago, are now discovering that a very thorough regionalization, or a federal, indeed even confederal system could reduce their region's tax burden. A recent survey conducted jointly by the two major daily newspapers LE SOIR and DE STANDAARD revealed that, reform or not, appeasement or not, the gulf between the points of view of the two communities is widening. For example, Senator Hugo Schiltz, deputy chairman of the Volksunie [Flemish National Party], explained: "What is separating us more and more, is not our two different languages as much as our two ways of life, two conceptions of society and of the economy. In fact, the measures being taken to control the economic crisis are a

striking demonstration of this fact. Especially as economic matters pose the most problems in determining the division of powers between the central government, regions, and communities. The intercommunity issue continues to crop up, regardless of all efforts to cast it out.

Yet the "linguistic" parties have remained somewhat guarded and noncommittal these past few months. These parties as well as the Liberals--back again in the opposition which they are reluctant to situate too far to the right, without always managing to avoid doing so--have been preparing for new elections which, even before Martens' resignation, they generally considered near. But the traditional political class, by and large, questions the advisability of dissolving Parliament before the end of its normal term of office in December 1982. It has been quite a long time since a Belgian Parliament has been able to complete its full term. Consequently there is apprehension within the parties that political personnel as a whole may emerge totally discredited from a new major crisis.

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CSO: 3100/692



## UIL'S BENVENUTO MEETS SOLIDARITY REPRESENTATIVES

Rome QUOTIDIANO AUSI in Italian 2 Apr 81 p 6

[Text] Ausi, 1 April--At the invitation of the FENEAL [expansion unknown]-UIL [Italian Union of Labor], Piotr Wicha and Marek Budzynski, construction experts from the Polish trade union Solidarity engaged in a friendly discussion with the secretary-general of the UIL, Giorgio Benvenuto. "We are passing through the most delicate part of the process of rehabilitating Poland. Polish society wants changes, while the most obstinate elements in the party are seeking a collision of opposing forces. The incident in Bydgoszcz consisted of an act which was directed against free trade unions, and its purpose was to augment existing tensions and saddle Solidarity with responsibility for shortcomings and the economic crisis", Piotr Wicha said, among other things. "There are disagreements within Solidarity in regard to the procedures to be adopted in dealing with this test of strength, which is just another in a series of such tests. The agreements arrived at in Gdansk are not being honored. The authorities are trying to wear down the trade union organization and do not have the courage to remove from office the people who do not want a dialogue and negotiations", Marek Budzynski said.

"We support the process which is now going on--the social dialectic process", said Giorgio Benvenuto, "and we hope that Solidarity will be able to preserve the unity which has made new democratic victories possible in Poland. The Italian workers are concerned about what may happen in your country, and they hope, above all, that incidents such as the one in Bydgoszcz will continue to be isolated ones. Repressive intervention on a large scale, whether carried out by internal or external forces, would cause incalculable damage to what remains of the policy of detente. Resort to the use of force would compel us, in spite of ourselves, to break relations with those who today are working to put an end to the Polish experiment and bring about a repetition of what happened earlier in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Ten years have passed since a number of people died in Gdansk and Szczecin. The monument you erected in front of the shipyards is not only a symbol but also a warning to everybody. Moderation must prevail and the dialogue must be resumed; in that way, you will defeat the forces that aim at obtaining revenge and bringing about a collision of opposing forces. Such a defeat was also obtained in Italy", he said.

The two representatives of the construction sector of the Polish Solidarity trade union will be guests of the FENEAL-UIL congress which is being held at Abano Terme from 2 to 4 April 1981.

## BRIEFS

SOVIET LABOR UNION VISIT--Ausi, 30 March 81--A delegation of representatives from the trade-union school of the USSR was entertained by the Organization and Policy Department of the Cadres of the CGIL and the board of directors of the CGIL's Trade Union Educational Center at Ariccia from 22 to 28 February 1981. The delegation, which consisted of Khorin, the president of the central school of the Soviet trade unions, Kasheev, a lecturer, and Dmitriev, a coworker of theirs, was met by Comrades Scheda and Zuccherini, from the secretariat of the CGIL, and the members of the Organization Department of the CGIL's International Office. Private meetings and exchanges of information on trade-union education were held with the board of directors of the Ariccia Trade Union Educational Center, with the people in charge of the CGIL IRES and of the INCA [National Federated Service Institute], of the CGIL Center at Impruneta and of the CGIL Chamber of Labor secretariat of the region of Tuscany. The delegation also visited the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] Educational Center at Fiesole. Subjects connected with the structure of trade-union education and the tools and methods used in the respective countries were discussed in depth during the course of the meetings. [Text] [Rome QUOTIDIANO AUSI in Italian 2 Apr 81 p 6] 9258

CGIL RECEIVES CGT DELEGATION--Ausi, 19 March 81--A CGT delegation consisting of Michel Wrsckolak, Pierre Glanzows and Jean Gallant was received in Rome yesterday by a CGIL delegation consisting of Giacinto Militello, Giancarlo Meroni and Sauro Magnani. The two delegations thoroughly examined the economic, social, political and trade-union situations in their respective countries and the political orientations and initiatives which each of the two organizations is working out to deal with those situations. Although the situations and attitudes in the two countries are different, a common desire to work out a vigorous program of action to deal with the attack being made by the employers' organizations, some governments and the conservative political forces of Europe upon the jobs and living conditions of the workers and the power of the trade unions became apparent to the participants. Within that framework, the two delegations discussed their respective points of view regarding the economic situation and the situation of the trade unions both in Europe and internationally. The discussion, which was carried on in an atmosphere of frankness, friendship and mutual respect, made it possible to go thoroughly into the points where the two organizations agree and disagree in their respective analyses and strategies, and they decided to develop their relations with each other in that spirit. [Text] [Rome QUOTIDIANO AUSI in Italian 20 Mar 81 p 12] 9258



SUPPORT TO WESTERN SAHARA--The CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation, upon reaffirming its own support of the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination and of the application of the resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity, has acted in the hope that the parties involved will arrive at a just and definitive solution for the decolonization of Western Sahara. [Text] [Rome CONQUISTE DEL LAVORO in Italian 16 Mar 81 p 14] 8956

ICFTU MEETING--Ausi, 31 March 1981--From 22 to 30 August 1981, the second world meeting of young trade union members of the ICFTU will take place in Seville, Spain, with the anticipated participation of 5,000 young trade union members. For Italy, the participation of delegations from the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and the UIL [Italian Union of Labor] is anticipated, with 50 to 70 of our young people in attendance. The age of the participants is up to 30 years old. [Text] [Rome QUOTIDIANO AUSI in Italian 1 Apr 81 p 10] 8956

CGIL-DGB SEMINAR--Ausi, 7 March 1981--Promoted by the national DGB [German Trade Union Federation], in cooperation with the INCA [National Federated Service Institute]-CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], of Frankfurt, a seminar for union trustees of the DGB was held during the last few days at the union center. The program included a report on the implementation of the health reform and the proposal for pension reform in Italy and the rights of migrant workers in matters of social security in accordance with the rules of the EEC. The introductory report, made by Antonio Motta from the INCA central office, was followed by a broad debate with specific requests on the individual topics under discussion. Considering the interest and the usefulness of the initiative, it was proposed by mutual consent to repeat it during the course of the year. [Text] [Rome QUOTIDIANO AUSI in Italian 9-10 Mar 81 p 6] 8956

CSO: 3104/242

## POSSIBILITY OF LABOR-D'66-VVD COALITION DEBATED

D'66's Brinkhorst

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 2 May 81 pp 44, 46

[Text] The coming cabinet formation will be difficult. That much can already be predicted. It appears that the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] will again decide with whom it wants to govern. No clear indication will be given to the voters on that point before 26 May. Socialists, Liberals, and Democrats must also await the pleasure of the CDA. That is reason for L.J. Brinkhorst, D'66 member of the Second Chamber, and Dr F.A. Hoogendijk, editor in chief of ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, to start a discussion under the title: "Toward a different majority?"

Everybody in the Netherlands has gradually become convinced that a new cabinet after the elections of 27 May will face gigantic tasks: employment is increasing, social security and welfare payments are boiling over, and existing certainties are crumbling away. In short, the welfare state is in a crisis. That has led to a widespread feeling of depression. If the policy is to be convincing, it must first of all offer new prospects, politically and as to content. That is something more than offering (apparent) guarantees for the short term by serving group interests. Rather, it demands a constant weighing of many interests and rejection of a short-term policy.

This requires a cabinet that is as homogeneous and effective as possible, and one that operates on a broader base than the present cabinet. That rules out a so-called national cabinet, for that involves the guarantee that all political and social oppositions are built in. And what is still more important, it would be undemocratic because in practice any opposition would be silenced.

The most obvious thing under the present circumstances is therefore a cabinet of the PvdA [Labor Party], CDA, and D'66 [Democrats '66], for which the D'66 congress opted as first choice. Materials for this derive from comparison of the platforms, and more especially from the concrete political positions taken in the Second Chamber. But it is by no means certain that such a cabinet will come to pass. Even apart from personal antagonisms, there are important political differences between PvdA and CDA, intensified by PvdA chairman Max van den Berg, who has repeatedly stated that he does not want such a combination.

In addition, there is the question of what the long-term prospects are for such a combination, in view of the internal division, not only between the PvdA and the CDA, but also within each of these parties. Thus far a CDA-VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] cabinet has been the only alternative. D'66 does not desire to reinforce such a combination. The classical left-right axis no longer coincides with the real social conflicts, but it has a rôle-determining effect for the CDA's position.

It is the special mission of D'66 to try, as a party that is not bound either to class or interests or to religion, to break through set party political attitudes and, by taking an independent position, to offer a new perspective in this respect as well at the time of the cabinet formation. For that reason the D'66 congress chose, as a second option, a PvdA/D'66/VVD cabinet. That is a conscious choice, arising from the necessity of breaking through the real mutual exclusiveness of the PvdA and the VVD. Only D'66, which lies in the field of tension between the principles of freedom and equality interpreted by the VVD and the PvdA respectively, is capable of that. The PvdA and the VVD have shown that they cannot do that alone.

For various reasons such a breakthrough is important for the 1980's. First of all, in a democracy it is extraordinarily undesirable for one political grouping, whether divided into "blood groups" or not, to bear permanent government responsibility for what is now 60 years. An opposition rôle is desirable from time to time for regauging one's thinking, and we should not begrudge that to the CDA, either. But what is more important still is that for all kinds of social problems for which a political majority exists in the Second Chamber, because of the central part played by the CDA in every government, no solutions have ever been found. All of these questions lie in the nonmaterial sphere, which must be given a great deal of attention precisely during the next few years. I am thinking in that connection of morals legislation (abortion, euthanasia, etc.), but also of democratization of welfare work (see the discussion of the rôle of private initiative) and of the stagnation in education, health care, and housing. These are fields on which CDA and VVD are fundamentally divided and on which there exists a great degree of agreement between the last-mentioned party and PvdA and D'66. But, it may be objected, are there not great differences in socioeconomic matters and in the field of peace and security? I certainly do not wish to deny that, but on the other hand the margins are narrower in both fields than when Den Uyl made that observation 10 years ago. The international developments, if nothing else, contribute to the internal margins' becoming narrower and narrower.

In the socioeconomic field there are two central questions: the distribution of wealth and the guiding rôle of the authorities. Precisely in a time of declining economic growth, the PvdA will have to recognize that there are limits to the redistribution of wealth, while the VVD will have to recognize that overall means alone are insufficient to bring about an industrial revival.

And then the problems of peace and security. A substantive discussion must lead the VVD to realize that the traditional Atlantic alliance is being set aside, without raising the question of the ties with the United States. On the other hand, the PvdA must also see that a counterbalance for the United States requires greater European cooperation. A Dutch unilateral policy and/or a small-country policy offers insufficient assurance.

Lastly, from the European point of view as well, the search for a new political majority is worth the trouble of investigating. In many European countries the policy of social democracy is under great pressure. New answers must be found to the question of how to shape the welfare state in a period of decreasing growth and rethinking of the rôle of government. The same is true of liberalism, which has taken on varying aspects in Europe. For both, the word for the next few years must be: "Not more, but better." The possible collaboration between the British Social Democrats and Liberals and the cooperation for the last 10 years between the German SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] and FDP [Free Democratic Party] must also make us think.

The seemingly distant prospect is thus much more real than is generally believed, provided we are willing to open traditional truths to discussion. Thinking about the unthinkable has, after all, led to the fusion of the three Christian parties, which fought each other for a long time. He who refuses to think his way into such processes with the rest will be overtaken by the facts.

Dogmatists in the PvdA and the VVD will have difficulties with these ideas, and will even reject them as pure heresy. But an internal dialog in these two parties would offer the chance to think their own principles through anew. For many in the PvdA there is no need of that. To them talking with the VVD is the same thing as being in league with the enemy. The only thing that fits in with their views is the strategy of a majority of all leftist parties under the leadership of the PvdA, not even the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] being ruled out in advance. Others in the PvdA may want to reflect on the question of whether it is preferable to govern with a big CDA (whose rank and file, at least, are not much more progressive than those of the VVD) than with a VVD that is half as big. From the power point of view, no firm answer to that question is directly available.

In thinking through a coalition with PvdA and D'66, the VVD, too, is confronted with its own future. Does this party want to become the permanent conservative trailer of the CDA, which is only dragged out of the opposition lot when there is no alternative, and then put back when the CDA fears too much crumbling away on the left? Or is it still willing to become a modern liberal party on the basis of Geertsema's--alas--rejected program of principles, with the risk of alienating many new conservative voters, but with a clear political profile? There is no easy answer to that question, either.

With its second choice of a PvdA/D'66/VVD coalition, D'66 has provided the impulse for a new discussion. With this choice, D'66, too, is jumping over its own shadow. The years of vexation caused by the difference between progressive words and conservative deeds of the VVD delegation in the Second Chamber must not block our thinking about the great interests at stake. They are nothing more nor less than the realization in the Netherlands of a new political majority that can lead to a political consensus that is required for real social renewal. With all the uncertainties that we are facing, the 1980's offer an important challenge for that.



### Commentator's Views

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 2 May 81 pp 45, 46

[Commentary by Dr F.A. Hoogendijk, editor in chief of ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE]

[Text] The election campaign has been dull thus far. And that is strange, for the problems confronting this country are greater than ever. All eyes should thus be directed toward the politicians, but this is not the case. Even the political parties give the impression of not knowing which way we should go. The sources of inspiration in the Inner Court seem to have dried up. That makes the voters suspicious and dejected ("They're all alike").

VVD, CDA, and D'66 are all agitating for a sound economic life to overcome the economic crisis, but these parties are vague on how that is to be worked out. Oh, yes, a reduction in collective burdens, but that makes no sense unless it is done in a drastic way. Thus far that has not been "politically feasible." The PvdA thinks the authorities can push the economy back in the right direction by means of a central economic plan. If the authorities decide what is economically valuable, business and industry will follow along, according to the socialist reasoning. But there are many who question whether the authorities can do anything that the private economy could not do better.

Although economic control by the central authorities is a typical socialist note, the question arises whether the Labor Party of today is still seen by many voters as a *socialist* party. In these elections the PvdA's ideology, and also the ideologies of the CDA and the VVD, have hardly peeped around the corner thus far. Skimming off the cream from the highest incomes can hardly be called an ideology. This "solution" is solemnly put forward by all parties, but of course it has no real effect.

The margins between the various parties have thus become narrower and narrower. Only political connoisseurs can still discern them. The overwhelming majority of voters cannot, and sit watching in bewilderment when Mr Den Uyl says he would be quite willing to take a post as minister under Van Agt. By that statement Den Uyl eliminated at one blow one of the few visible contrasts and left many voters in despair. For 4 years Den Uyl has been tearing Van Agt to tatters, and now he is "a man of parts."

The VVD has more or less watched these 4 years go by, and has swallowed a lot to sit out a whole cabinet term with the CDA. But it appears that the VVD alone will be willing to collaborate with the CDA in the government once more, if it turns out that no business can be done with the PvdA. A second-choice position. And if the CDA and VVD cannot get a majority in the Second Chamber, this coalition will be out of the question, for D'66 will not reinforce it.

It cannot be denied that D'66 is the key to the coming cabinet formation. According to the latest opinion poll, 15 percent of the Netherlands feel at home with the "reasonable alternative." In practical politics, D'66 is between the Labor Party and the VVD. D'66 has little use for the CDA, and Brinkhorst would not consider a PvdA/VVD/D'66 coalition unthinkable. He advocates it if the Democrats' first choice--a CDA/PvdA/D'66 government--cannot be brought to pass.

D'66 is remarkably inconsistent with regard to the cabinet formation. Terlouw et al. are willing to govern with the PvdA and the CDA, but not with the VVD and the CDA. That is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the CDA has put its stamp on the policy of the present cabinet. D'66 is thus consciously setting itself against the VVD. "The difference between progressive words and conservative deeds of the VVD delegation in the Second Chamber has not made this party into an obvious party to negotiations. But I do believe that it is especially in order for the D'66 to investigate whether a PvdA/VVD/D'66 coalition can also be a reasonable alternative," Brinkhorst wrote back in November 1979 in the periodical CIVIS MONDI. [CIVIS MONDI is published by the Dutch Institute for Study of and Information Concerning East-West Relations, The Hague,--Translator]

In the first instance D'66 will have nothing to do with the VVD; the front door is closed to the voters, but the back door, meanwhile, has been left ajar by Brinkhorst. Pragmatism can lead to strange inconsistencies. But it can also lead to a cabinet that is manned with ministers that are less concerned about what is politically tenable than about what is good for the country. Such a cabinet would have to have an extraparlimentary character in order to loosen the bonds to the Second Chamber party groups.

In the view of D'66 that could be a coalition consisting of representatives of the PvdA, the VVD, and D'66. In the first choice, to be sure, D'66 opts for the CDA, but if that does not come off, it is attractive to D'66 to try for a different majority. With the CDA in the opposition, that is. Prime Minister Van Agt alluded to that himself when he said that "governing is losing its attraction." Thus far the KVP [Catholic People's Party] (now the CDA) has been the pivot on which Dutch politics turned. The CDA has frequently made use of that fact and thus provided for an ever-recurring factor of uncertainty.

This is a full-scale frustration for the Socialists, for the Liberals, and for the Democrats. Shutting the CDA out of an incoming cabinet would represent a historic breakthrough in Dutch politics. But in view of the mutual denunciations of PvdA and VVD, an intermediary's part would have to be played in it by D'66.

In the PvdA and the VVD a lot of sore toes will have to be amputated if it should go so far, but Brinkhorst's idea is certainly worth considering. But D'66 would have made it easier to reconcile the Liberals to this idea if D'66 had not ruled out the VVD in a possible government coalition with the CDA.

We suspect that the reason that D'66 is so much in the voters' favor is that in the eyes of a part of the electorate the parties that rest on an ideology cannot solve the problems of the day. Neither classical socialism nor classical liberalism, nor yet the Christian Democrats' Gospel pragmatism can provide the motive power to get our economy moving again.

But the socioeconomic difficulties and the continued existence of our welfare state are the central issues in these elections. It is precisely in this field that there are great differences in the thinking of socialists and liberals. This makes the working out of D'66's second option, i.e. a cabinet consisting of PvdA, VVD, and D'66 extra complicated. And comparison of the platforms shows that in socioeconomic matters D'66 is closer to the CDA than to the PvdA.



D'66 is scared to death of becoming an extension of a Van Agt/Wiegel cabinet. Understandably so. But if D'66 comes out as big as the opinion polls predict, D'66 would have every opportunity in the cabinet formation to bend the coming government policy in its direction. For that reason it seems to us that a cabinet relying on CDA, VVD, and D'66 could be a club that is largely in mutual agreement concerning the direction in which solutions for our economic crisis must be sought.

But the D'66 party congress does not want that. It is therefore interesting that Brinkhorst, the number two man in D'66, has now made a gesture toward the VVD. By a long detour, to be sure, via the PvdA, but we would welcome a cooperation between D'66 and the VVD. Both parties, to be sure, are very critical of each other, but that is not unusual between parties that are essentially close to each other.

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CSO: 3105/136

## NON-SOCIALIST VOTERS FRUSTRATED BY PARTIES' WRANGLING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Mar 81 p 3

[Article by Egil Sunder]

[Text] In a time when the entire situation of the society is uncertain, and when large sections of the voters are looking for fixed points and a uniting alternative, the Conservative Party is the only non-socialist party which takes a clear and unequivocal position on the government issue. So far it has proved impossible to arrange a clarifying joint statement prior to the election to the effect that a non-socialist majority will result in a non-socialist coalition government with representatives from the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Center Party. This lack of resoluteness on the part of the non-socialists may easily result in the development of an atmosphere of doubt, resignation and powerlessness among people of non-socialist views who feel that the main task must now be to give the country a new government and a new policy.

Within the Center Party, which is at present assembled for a national congress at Stevanger, they apparently feel that it is downright foolish to commit the party to a government cooperation with the Conservative Party without all demands and conditions being arranged beforehand. And to the Christian People's Party, the party's ultimatum in respect of the abortion issue is still a reality and will remain so right up to the election. The Christian People's Party makes it a condition of its participation in a government cooperation with other parties that the right of free abortion be abolished, i.e. that the woman herself must have the final and decisive word on this matter. If, for this or other reasons, the Christian People's Party should decide that it cannot participate in a government cooperation together with the Conservative Party, the Center Party will do the same thing.

## A Clear Line

Political observers--and this, no doubt, also applies to many voters on the grassroots level--cannot avoid noting a tendency on the part of the Center Party and the Christian People's Party to want to exert

pressure on, tie down or force the Conservative Party to various commitments. The question how the three parties will together be able to counter the renewed offensive of the Labor Party under the leadership of Gro Harlem Brundtland is, at any rate, at the national congress of the Center Party viewed as sheer nonsense. From the purely practical point of view of the Center Party, the debate at its national congress should deal with political issues on which the Center Party will be able to define its position, it is being said. That the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Center Party would have a common task, and that they should commit themselves to solving it together out of respect for the future of the country and its people--something like that one practically never hears from the parties of the center. They first have to decide the political conditions to be made before they can even conceive of cooperating with the Conservative Party in a government and thus form the basis for a stable majority government in this country.

#### A Minimum Demand

The attitude toward political cooperation expressed here will hardly meet with sympathy on the part of most people, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the change in the relative strengths of the non-socialist parties is somewhat connected with this. It ought to be a minimum demand of political parties that one knows where they stand on central issues without having to go into all kinds of interpretations to find the right answer. It is about time for the voters to get to know precisely what kind of government we shall get if the non-socialists should win the election. But neither the Center Party nor the Christian People's Party wants to make an unambiguous statement in this respect.

#### Wants to Pressure Conservative Party

It was said of Jens Hundseid--the leader of the Center Party during the period between World War I and World War II--that "not even a prophet can predict what position he will take when the time comes to take a position."

Although, when it comes to the pure interests of farmers, there has, of course, never been any doubt. As, for example, in connection with the crisis pact between the Agrarian Party and the Labor Party between World War I and World War II when Hundseid exclaimed: "As long as the Agrarian Party gets the butter prices we want, we shall be happy to agree to anything!"

Here--if nowhere else--a clear line goes through the history of the Center Party.

But on the question of government prior to the momentous election in September, the voters are still to be left in doubt, for, under any circumstances, the Center Party has said that if the Christian People's Party does not want to participate, the Center Party will not participate either in a broad non-socialist government. Besides, as is well known, conditions will be made toward the Conservative Party.

Now it should, however, be pointed out that Johan J. Jakobsen, chairman and parliamentary leader, made it quite clear in his opening speech at the national congress how he himself looks at the government question. It will be a definite advantage, he said, if a non-socialist government would have a parliamentary majority behind it in the Storting. Implied: Such a government cannot be formed without the participation of the Conservative Party.

If the chairman had adhered to this, it would have had quite a different clarifying effect than if--as was the case--he suggests a center government as a possible alternative. Such an alternative cannot at all be regarded as realistic in the present situation. There is but one credible alternative to the government we have and that is a government in which the Conservative Party participates.

Nevertheless, it is, of course, worth noting that prominent politicians within both the Christian People's Party and the Center Party attach greater importance to concrete political moves between these parties and the Liberal Party than to the broad cooperation in which also the Conservative Party participates. A statement made by Jakobsen to the weekly newspaper of the Liberal Party VÅR FRAMTID after the tax dissent of the parties of the center last fall is characteristic of this assessment. Jakobsen said:

"The cooperation developed among the three parties of the center in the Storting is in good shape. Concrete, practical cooperation on issues is a far stronger indication of one's political position than verbal assurances or less committing moves."

Nobody probably is in any doubt as to what Jakobsen here has in mind. And that is precisely what is so distressing--both to the Center Party and to the broad non-socialist cooperation.

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CSO: 3108/118

## STORTING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE CENTERS ON POLAND

Oslø ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 27 Mar 81 p 14

[Article by Torbjørn Flørevik]

[Text] "Now it is a question of shutting up!"

These words by Chr. Michelsen to Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson were brought up again yesterday when the Storting convened for its traditional pre-spring foreign policy debate. It was in connection with his comments on the serious situation in Poland that the main speaker of the Labor Party, Reiulf Steen, found it appropriate to call the attention of the meeting to the words by the late Chr. Michelsen.

"First of all, we must refrain from making moves with a view to our own domestic public without evaluating carefully the effects they will have on developments in Poland itself," Reiulf Steen said, adding that we would be wise to take Lech Walesa's advice to "keep our hands off it."

On the whole, it must be said that the participants in the debate complied with this request from the chairman of the Labor Party. In most speeches, the confrontation in Poland was merely touched on in general and brief terms. The main theme of the debate was once more the armaments of the superpowers and the aggravated East-West relations. Several speakers, moreover, took the opportunity to make some critical remarks on the debut of the Reagan administration, not least in Latin America, and in El Salvador in particular. Apart from that, there was no doubt about our relations with South Africa.

The proposal by the Labor Party to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area was mentioned in a few of the speeches, but that was all. At present, this move does not seem to be any topical theme for debate in our national assembly. It is true that Reiulf Steen pointed out that the proposal deliberately was given a flexible form. But after the most recent reactions in American quarters, and also from the foremost NATO spokesmen (such as Admiral Robert Falls), it seems as if this potato has become hotter than was previously assumed. Even if Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund said that the work for nuclear-free zones will be given high priority as soon as the national congress of the Labor Party has made a statement on the matter.



It was considerably more interesting to note the skepticism, indeed concern, which is spreading among our politicians with regard to the new leadership in the United States.

Reiulf Steen contented himself with expressing concern at the "dangerous notes" coming from the new U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick, on the policy toward Latin America. Inger Lise Gjerov of the Labor Party said in her speech that, in the case of good friends, one should avail oneself of one's right to criticize--that is to say, when this was called for. Lars Roar Langalet of the Conservative Party found several alarming elements in the policy of the Reagan administration, "even if these traits, undoubtedly, become exaggerated by a well-known anti-American propaganda machine."

"What we expect from the world's most powerful, democratic state is that the emphasis be placed on strengthening the liberal forces and creating the basis for social reforms, law and order, and democracy," he pointed out. Would it be fair already at this stage to suggest that Langalet will be a bit disappointed at the leadership in the White House and in the Pentagon?

Obviously referring to those who say that the government has been too cautious, both in its criticism of the United States and the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund said:

"These low-key statements are based on an evaluation of our own national interests. In view of our location, Norway has a clear interest in an improvement in the relations between the big powers and in a reduction of the tension. It, therefore, is obvious that one will seek to put emphasis on the factors which can improve relations, lead to negotiations, and solutions through negotiations."

But this official low-key attitude, fortunately, does not mean that the government will refrain from furthering its viewpoints through the right channels. Knut Frydenlund assured the Storting that the government will state its opinion on this and other matters in connection with the upcoming consultations with the administration in Washington. In the same breath, the foreign minister drew attention to the fact that, in his statement made in the Storting in 1977, he had supported the foreign policy course of former President Carter. A course which, among other things, dissociated itself from the form of fear of communists which led to the embrace of dictators because they were anti-communist.

It is hoped that these were a few words of comfort also to Stein Ørnhei of the Socialist Left Party, who really used his big sledge-hammer, let alone his meat-axe, in his reference to Reagan and his men.

A final remark: 14 representatives had arrived in the assembly hall when Reiulf Steen started the foreign policy debate yesterday. When Lars Korvald somewhat later started speaking, only eight were left. A bit later, Kåre Willoch was on the rostrum, and the number of representatives present had again risen to 14. Hans Hammond Rossbach had to content himself with an audience of five, three of whom sat reading the local afternoon paper. At no point during the morning session did we see more than sixteen representatives in the assembly hall. But they all agreed that the "world is experiencing its worst crisis for a long time."

## POLL SHOWS BRUNDTLAND GENERATES SUPPORT FOR LABOR PARTY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Mar 81 p 3

[Text] The Labor Party is making progress. After a setback toward the end of last year, when the party dropped to about 40 percent, the Labor Party has now made progress in 3 months in a row and, according to the February poll, is at 46.9 percent, 3.6 percent higher than the January figure. The Conservative Party is at a standstill, with the same support as the previous month, viz. 31.2 percent. The Socialist-Left Party, the Liberal Party, and the Progressive Party are experiencing the worst setbacks.

The Conservative Party is thus still at the 'top level' for the party, seeing that it has not had any greater support previously in the polls taken by the Norwegian Market Data, Inc. The long-term trend for the Conservative Party has been increasing, but with minor fluctuations during the past year.

The Progressive Party, which drops from 3.5 to 2.0 percent, shows the biggest setback. The support for the Progressive Party has been fluctuating during the last few months, but it is long since the party has had as little support as now. Also the Socialist-Left Party is experiencing a setback, from 6.0 to 5.1 percent.

This poll was taken during the period from 16 February to 12 March. The prime minister change took place during the first week of February.

The secretary of the Labor Party, Ivar Leveraas, says that the figures clearly reflect the prime minister change and the support generated by Gro Harlem Brundtland. "People who used to belong to the Labor Party have now jumped down from the fence and have rejoined the ranks," says Leveraas, adding: "But there is a long way to victory at the polls."

Leveraas has no answer to the question why the progress of the Labor Party is not taking place at the cost of, for example, the Conservative Party, the Center Party, and the Christian People's Party. Such polls are too complicated to allow any definite conclusions to be drawn from them, he says. Leveraas adds, however, that the developments within the non-socialist parties at present will, no doubt, help the Labor Party.

The chairman of the Conservative Party, Jo Benkow, says that the Conservative Party is gratified that the progress that was expected for the Labor Party after the prime minister change did not hurt the parties which form the political government alternative.

"When the attention again focuses on important political issues, such as the price increases, the danger of increased unemployment, the decline in the housing construction activities, and questions associated with the security policy, it will be interesting to see whether voters who were about to leave the Labor Party are now content with the fact that the party merely shifted a few of the people around who are holding the leading positions," Benkow says.

"The present poll, otherwise, indicates that the tens of thousands of voters who joined the Conservative Party from the Labor Party after the election in 1977 do not seem to attach any decisive importance to the changes of persons. To them it is presumably the support of a different policy as pursued by the Conservative Party which is the determining factor," Jo Benkow says.

[Poll results on next page]

# TABLE 2 POLITICAL POLL

	STARTING ELECTION SEP 1977 %	COUNTY ELECTIONS SEP 1977 %	1980 Sep %	1980 Dec %	1981 Jan %
Swedish Liberal Party .....	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
Labour Party .....	42.3	36.2	35.9	31.6	36.9
Communist Party .....	0.4	-	0.4	0.5	0.5
Radical-left Party .....	<u>4.4</u> 47.5	<u>4.4</u> 41.5	<u>4.6</u> 41.7	<u>6.2</u> 59.6	<u>5.1</u> 47.7
Protestant Party .....	1.9	2.5	3.2	4.1	2.0
Liberal People's Party .....	1.4	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.7
Far-right Party .....	24.8	29.7	29.0	29.9	31.2
Christian People's Party .....	12.4	10.1	12.2	12.5	11.0
Green Party .....	8.6	8.6	8.1	6.9	6.6
Liberal Party .....	3.2	5.3	5.1	6.0	4.5
Others .....	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.8
TOTAL .....	100.1	99.4	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of Party Preference ...			1107	1086	1065
TOTAL Number Pollled .....			1432	1377	1445

The figures result from a comparison of each party against the Starting position in 1977. Calculated statistical error limits estimated at a magnitude of 2 percent for voter shares close to 50 percent, about 3 percent for voter shares of 10-40 percent, and approximately 5 percent for lower voter shares.

The polling took place during the period 16 February - 12 March 1981

The Investigation Market Data, Inc., Oslo, 20 March 1981

## CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY LEADER DEFECTS TO LABOR

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 17 Mar 81 p 7

[Text] "The Christian People's Party is in the process of becoming a right-wing party with Christian characteristics."

That is why Bente Lie Johnsen, a former member of the central committee of the youth organization, has resigned from the party.

"I know that some people, perhaps especially young people, are thinking of doing the same thing. Fortunately, there are also a few members of the parent organization who are in despair at the line taken by Party Chairman Kåre Kristiansen," she tells ARBEIDERBLADET.

Her resignation after a couple of years of active party work is in protest against the party's hysteric dedication to certain causes, its moralizing attitude, and its shift toward the right.

"I react strongly to the fact that only the abortion issue is brought into focus in connection with the question of government participation with the Conservative Party. I am surprised that leading party people do not realize that there are far more issues than the abortion issue which separate the Christian People's Party from the Conservative Party.

On the oil and industrial policies, foreign aid and protection of the environment, the Conservative Party stands for other values. The leadership of the Christian People's Party is willing to disregard these matters, for the benefit of the abortion issue, which is so close to their hearts. Do they not realize that the policies in the other areas are more important to the future of Norway than the abortion issue?"

Bente Lie Johnsen, who is a catechist in the church, is also disappointed at the party's moralizing and admonishing attitude. Social ethics is a secondary consideration.

"The foremost task of Jesus was to fight for the weak, the oppressed, and those ostracized by the society. That is an example which Christians should follow. But those of us who believed that the Christian People's Party would be facing new challenges are greatly disappointed. By concentrating upon



...close to their hearts on which they have stiffened in their opinions, the Christian People's Party fails both the center government alternative and its own policy program."

These words were expressed by Sente Lie Johnson, who has made it clear to the Christian People's Party that she will, in the fall, be voting for the Liberal Party.

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## BRIEFS

**LIBERAL PEOPLE'S PARTY CONGRESS**--The Liberal People's Party will support a broad non-socialist government. In a resolution adopted unanimously at the party's ninth national congress held in Bergen last weekend, it was stressed that the Liberal People's Party is a social-liberal center party, independent of the blocs in Norwegian politics. The party will support a government the policy of which is anchored in the center, and it cannot give guarantees to a Labor Party government, nor to a purely Conservative government. The national congress was marked by optimism prior to the Storting elections to be held in the fall, and there is great confidence that the party will have real possibilities of becoming represented in the Storting. The party program for 1981-85, which was adopted with minor changes, is characterized by reforms, one of the goals of which is to secure minimum wage pensioners 50 percent of the wages of an average industrial worker. The program also comprises patient care, the construction of 44,000 new dwellings per year and support of cooperative housing. The party also wants complete trade and shipping boycotts of South Africa. [Text] [Cite: Aftenbladet in Norwegian 30 Mar 81 p 7] 7262

CSC 1125/118

## RESPONSIBILITIES, PROGRAMS OF ISTRID

Rome RIVISTA MARITTIMA in Italian Mar 81 pp 13-15

[Text] What It Is.

Last November, ISTRID (Institute for Studies and Research of Defense Problems) was 1 year old. The institute's purpose is to help identify rational and timely solutions to problems of national defense--to include those influenced by present-day social dynamics--and to make them known to the public.

To attain these ends, ISTRID, which is composed of a Board of Directors and an Assembly consisting of 55 members, is in the process of undertaking research on fundamental aspects of world military policy, as for example:

--military expenditures, defense budget, military planning and coordination in major countries;

--military expenditures in Third World countries and position of the armed forces in the frameworks of emerging states;

--dynamics and dimensions of "local conflicts," analyzing their nature, characteristics, implications, developmental tendencies and hypothetical consequences, in addition to relations between various parties in conflict and the arms supplying states, to include the need for technical assistance;

--principal countries' armed forces order of battle;

--update on weapons and weapon inventories, to include nuclear weapons.

A specific research section deals with the so-called "military industrial complex." One of ISTRID's tasks is to verify its role, its position and its structure, within the framework of our own country and on a worldwide scale and within the defense's plan of scheduling policy.

For the studies, research and information the institute makes use, in addition to its own resources, of specific scientific committees, of scholars, of technicians specializing in military problems, members of Parliament, government leaders, journalists with special expertise, young persons from the academic world and technicians from industries engaged in defense. In addition, from time to time ISTRID

tasks individuals or working groups with research projects and cooperates with other institutes which specialize in related fields, putting its "documentation center" at their disposal. The documentation section of the above mentioned organization (now only in its beginning phase, consisting of specialized national and foreign magazines and War College Studies) is scheduled to expand thanks to its links with documentation sections of the Defense Technical-Scientific Council and to those of related industrial sectors.

#### 1980 Activities and Programs for 1981

In 1980, ISTRID took part in conventions, debates and round tables and developed contacts with members and authorities of the government, high-ranking representatives from the military and representatives from the industrial and labor union sector.

Among those successful initiatives to be noted are:

--a convention-debate on the subject of "Defense Planning Within a Framework of Security, Detente and Disarmament." The speakers included, among others Senator Adolfo Sarti, former Minister of Defense, Admiral Giovanni Torrisi, Defense Chief of Staff, Gen Eugenio Cucino, the army chief of staff, and high officials from the armed forces, from Parliament, journalists and university faculty members;

--a debate on "Military Personnel Problems," chaired by Hon D'Alessio, which emphasized the necessity of facing these problems with a will to find valid and timely solution for them;

--a debate on "Housing Problems for Personnel in the Armed Forces," chaired by Hon Paolo Battino Vittorelli and introduced by Hon Pasquale Bandiera and Hon Aldo D'Alessio;

--a data discussion on the theme "Territory Defense," in the course of which, following the introductory remarks by Hon Giuseppe Zamberletti and Gen Eugenio Rambaldi, the following subjects were discussed:

--"Territorial defense in an international and an Italian context" (Dr Maurizio Cremasco);

--"Territorial defense and fundamental problems in the defense of the West" (Prof Virgilio Ilari);

--"Territorial defense within the framework of a new military model and a new military strategy" (Hon Falco Accame);

--"The present-day international position of Italy and politico-social cohesion of the population" (Hon Eliseo Milani);

--"Territorial Defense and Civil Defense" (Hon Arrigo Boldrini);

--"Territorial defense as subordinate hypothesis of the Army's level of efficiency" (Gen Ettore Brancato);

--"Territorial defense in the framework of an integrated defense global strategy" (Gen Andrea Viglione);

--"The political-military nexus of our defenses" (Prof Antonio Lombardo);

--"Present-day value of response and territorial defense limits" (Gen Andrea Cucino);

--"The draft and territorial defense" (Admiral Franco Micali Baratelli);

--A debate on "Disposition of the Armed Forces and improvement of military personnel"; among the numerous contributors, particular attention is given to that of Maresciallo Giuseppe Guarnieri, exemplifying the wide range of personnel actively interested in the problem.

ISTRID's main activities for 1981 will deal with organizing a national convention, open to foreign observers, dealing with "The Role of Italy" in the Mediterranean for a peaceful solution of present tensions, for the autonomous development of relations in this area, and for the creation of a system of guarantees among all states, to be backed up by military means of defense, if needed.

In addition, during the present year a second convention will be held dealing with "Planning for Defense," to examine the legislative and procedural methodology for actually bringing the plan to fruition; furthermore, a study seminar on "Law themes of military codes" will be organized.

The institute also plans to spearhead initiatives for the celebration of the centenary of Garibaldi's death, to encourage public discussion of items of present day interest, such as civil defense and women in the armed forces.

[Box 1]

Istituto Studi e Ricerche Difesa (ISTRID)  
Institute for Research and Studies in Defense  
President: Hon Paolo Battino Vittorelli  
Board of Directors:  
Hon Pasquale Bandiera  
Hon Aldo D'Alessio  
Hon Giuseppe Zamberletti  
Members--January 1981: 51  
Date of Foundation: 26 November 1979  
Headquarters: Via Maria Adelaide 4/6, Rome  
Telephone: 360 06 74 - 361 21 88

[Box 2]

L'Agenzia Informazioni Parlamentari Difesa (IPD)  
Defense Parliamentary Information Agency  
ISTRID avails itself of IPD (which in 1980 published an 18-issue "Notiziario" and 5 monographs) with the aim of making public accurate data on the results of studies and research and to furnish timely and detailed information on parliamentary activity related to the field of defense.



## AUDITOR AGENCY CRITICIZES POOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT PLANS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Apr 81 p 10

[Text] Effective and goal-oriented direction of Sweden's readiness stockpile is lacking, according to the National Accounting and Audit Bureau. On Wednesday the bureau delivered a report of its investigation of procurement activities to the National Board of Economic Defense (OEF).

The report is very critical of many points, including the lack of positive information about how much of the stockpile will no longer be used.

OEF should make a broad listing of materials of which it is not known when they will be used. These materials would then either be stored longer, or disposed of. That requires planning, control, and appraisal.

The report of the National Accounting and Audit bureau says that OEF planning has for a long time been governed by traditional readiness stockpiling, and it requires more flexible measures.

In planning for peacetime crises the definitions are unclear. For example, there is no common agreement on which areas OEF is responsible for and which standards will be maintained in a crisis, says the report.

"The decision to procure stores rests in different cases on very uncertain ground," said Goran Steen of the audit bureau, who was in charge of the investigation.

## Review

OEF is forced to generalize. OEF has anticipated shortages of goods in a large number of areas. These are reviewed all too seldom.

For more effective control it is also essential that there be a more thorough analysis of costs.

"Review began two years ago, and concerns matters which happened several years before," said Bengt Siosteen, division director in OEF.

The Accounting and Audit Bureau emphasizes in its report that economic defense has taken a new direction recently, and points out the importance of continuing this work.

## AIR FORCE RESPONDED 57 TIMES TO AIRSPACE INCURSIONS IN 1980

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Apr 81 p 28

[Text] Swedish fighter aircraft were launched 421 times last year to investigate violations or incidents in Swedish airspace. Activities around Sweden were normal last year, but increased during the autumn when the crisis in Poland grew worse and Swedish readiness was increased.

When one or more foreign submarines were detected in the vicinity of Uto in the Swedish archipelago, readiness of antisubmarine forces was increased in the Eastern Military District. But submarines have been detected in other places along the coast, including far north in the Gulf of Bothnia.

The Defense Staff has prepared a summary of what happened last year. Among other things it shows that 57 incidents happened in Swedish airspace during 1980.

## Coast of Skane

Most of them happened around the coast of Skane. In the Defense Staff they say that there are three types of incidents: "violations or probable violations," "possible violations," and "other incidents."

The reason why so many happened around the coast of Skane is that NATO has a firing range in the Bornholm area, and it often happens that NATO aircraft enter Swedish airspace.

As to incidents at sea, such as when foreign government ships transit Swedish waters without advance notification, this happened 61 times. Most of these incidents took place in The Sound.

Foreign submarines surfaced on 11 occasions, which is next to the highest number in recent years.

The violations occurred most frequently in connection with exercises by the two pact forces. The Warsaw Pact and NATO each had two exercises last year. When the situation in Poland changed last autumn, east bloc exercises at sea and in the air declined, but command post and land forces exercises increased.

#### Increased Resources

As to the unlawful transit of ships, NATO was responsible for 26 and the Warsaw Pact for 18.

The submarine off Uto was mentioned by the Defense Staff only in confirming that there was participation, but without result.

It was also said that the type of submarine was identified, but not which country it came from.

The commanders of the Southern and Eastern Military Districts received additional funds during the autumn to maintain readiness.

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CSO: 3109/170

MILITARY

SWEDEN

#### BRIEFS

SEASPACE INCURSIONS INCREASE--Stockholm, 23 Apr--At least 13 violations of Swedish territorial waters took place during 1980. That is the second highest number during the past 10 years. The violations at sea involved the west, south, and east coasts. In four cases they were caused by NATO ships, and in five cases by ships of the Warsaw Pact. During the year there were also 44 transits of territorial waters without advance notification through diplomatic channels. That is the largest number observed in recent years, according to a report to be released shortly by the Defense Staff. Last year the number of submarine incidents was unusually high. There were 11 cases in which foreign submarines remained in Swedish waters without permission. The most serious of these incidents occurred during a short period last September. Then one or more foreign submarines were observed within a very restricted area east of Uto in Stockholm's southern archipelago. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Apr 81 p 4] 9287

CSO: 3109/170



## PROSPECTS FOR INDEPENDENCE OF NEW CALEDONIA, OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

Paris ETUDES in French Mar 81 pp 293-304

[Article by Gabriel Marc: "Destiny of French Overseas Territories--The Example of New Caledonia"]

[Excerpts] The Overseas Territories (TOM), often confused with the Overseas Departments (DOM), are a singular part of the colonial heritage of France. They are neither French departments nor independent countries, and their status--intermediate in a way--seems unstable and oscillates toward sometimes one, sometimes the other model. What will it be like tomorrow? A serious study cannot seek an overall answer to this question because the cases are so different from one another. The example of New Caledonia demonstrates well the complexity of these problems with which we are and inevitably will continue to be confronted. In this case alone, the elements that must be taken into consideration are so numerous that any attempt to give an account of them in a few pages is a risky venture. Simplistic reductions, omissions, and especially the absence of the nuances of the reality are inevitable, even though this country is small in population: 130,000 as of the 1976 census, perhaps 140,000 now.

Since 1947, the question of New Caledonia's status has been constantly at the heart of political debate. The previous colonial institutions had accustomed the whites to a specific system of government and administration, very decentralized and very favorable to their interests. The advent of universal suffrage in 1947 and the elimination of the double college in 1951 constituted the mother country's first impairments of the supremacy of the whites. The application, in 1955, of a status establishing very broad autonomy, modeled on that which was to lead the territories of Africa to independence, caused a reaction among the whites, who in 1958, under cover of the fall of the Fourth Republic, rose up against the local governmental bodies, the chief of the Caledonian Union, led by Mr Lenormand, who had the mass of the Melanesians behind him. The governments of the Fifth Republic then tried to take the Territory in hand again, profoundly modifying its status and setting up an administration and legislation inspired by those of the mother country. But the end of the "nickel boom" and the halting of immigration from France finally led the whites in elective office to demand a status of very broad autonomy, which they would control, preferring this to the status of a department, which they would not be able to control. The government therefore modified the status again, in this direction, while at the same time ensuring better representation of the whites in the Territorial Assembly and in the National Assembly by the creation of a second deputy's seat for the white district of Noumea and by a modification of the distribution of the seats in the Territorial Assembly and election-law changes.

This status was adopted by the National Assembly at the end of December 1976. By virtue of it, a High Commissioner provides the central government's representation in the Territory and chairs a seven-member Council of Government, without voting in it.<sup>1</sup> This Council has full powers over everything relating to territorial competence, particularly the budget, and is responsible to a Territorial Assembly. The vice chairman of this Council becomes the Territory's No 2 personage. The 36-member Territorial Assembly, elected for 5-year terms by universal suffrage, is the decision-making organ for territorial matters.

At the time--in Spring 1978--when the new secretary of state for overseas departments and territories, Paul Dijoud, assumed his duties, the institutions provided for by the status legislation were functioning poorly. On some major points, notably the imposition of taxes, the Territorial Assembly is divided by factionalism, and its relations with the Council of Government are strained. Underlying these conflicts is a revival of the debate relating to department status and independence.

The partisans of department status are obviously whites. For them, it is a form of security. In effect, it protects them against what threatens them--the economic crisis, the maneuvers aimed toward independence, the environmental pressures--and it guarantees them social services that are in line with the standards of France. In their eyes, the advantages to France of this solution, which is expensive for it, is the availability of a quarter of the world's reserves of nickel, advantages related to the extension of maritime zones to 200 miles, and a French-speaking islet in an English-speaking ocean.

If one imagines the feelings of people who perceive that they have "made the country" in a few generations, who feel they are far from France, and who for the most part are of modest--indeed, very modest--condition, one understands the strength of the need for security that they manifest. Where would they go if they had to leave "the Pebble"?

Those who do not want department status are the Melanesians in particular. It would, in effect, represent a form of cultural assimilation. Though their culture is malleable and capable of remaking itself to take account of modernity, it resists cross-breeding. It would therefore have to disappear or be reduced to an insignificant matter of folklore for tourists. Those involved feel this in a thousand ways<sup>2</sup> and experience it mainly through the educational institutions. School programs and rhythms prove unsuited to their cultural predispositions.

Despite everything, the educational level of the young Kanakas is gradually rising. Some of them are now secondary-school graduates, or even hold college diplomas. The average level is close to the BEPC [Elementary School Diploma]. This means that the young groups have the means for analyzing daily life and taking a critical view of their lot. The most intellectual of them are seeking a cultural identity to assert. Kanaka culture, even if dislocated by colonization and contact with modernity, constitutes a solid foundation. It asserted itself in a cultural festival in September 1975 called "Melanesia 2000." Held in Noumea, the city of the whites, this festival revealed to many of them the vitality of a culture which they had wanted to believe was dead.

The young people have acquired considerable awareness, even if, on the whole, they have not committed themselves in a political party. In an ethnic framework in which only the statements of the "elders" carry weight, the young are finding a way to ex-

press themselves, with the agreement of the elders, who are both afraid and abet them. They have not experienced the humiliations of the colonial way of dealing with "natives," and even though the Kanaka rhythm is a slow one, they say that--unlike their fathers--they do not want to wait 30 years to see things change. They are exasperated at not finding employment, even in the civil service, despite the diplomas they have earned at such cost. For them, there is only one issue: Kanaka independence. They are not the only ones to think this way.

In the summer of 1978, the secretary of state for overseas departments and territories declared clearly, in the Territory itself, that the Kanaka community does not have the place that belongs to it, that a land reform is called for, and that the realization of a balanced multiracial society is the main road for the future. His speech was greeted with anxious amazement by the whites and with sceptical attention by the Melanesians, who have already heard many promises that have quickly come to nothing.

Very soon afterward, a mission of experts--high-level officials--reviewed the Territory's problems and worked out, under the guidance of the secretary of state, a "long-term economic and social development plan for New Caledonia," commonly referred to as the "Dijoud Plan."

The secretary of state is counting on the support of the moderate Kanakas of the Caledonian Union, who are well-represented in the Territorial Assembly. But it is too late. The local discussion of the Plan reveals that the UC [Caledonian Union] is leaning toward Kanaka independence and that the Melanesians have lost confidence. They recognize the quality and courage of the Plan's provisions, to be sure, but they cannot accept the bias enunciated in its title, "Living in France in New Caledonia," or the 10-year schedule that it entails. They want to discuss a political change at once.

On the eve of a visit by the president of the republic, planned for July 1979, the institutions were obstructed and even the moderate Kanakas were calling for independence. Very quickly as always, as is his style, which is unsuited to the Melanesian rhythm but is indisputably dynamic by the mother country's standards, the secretary of state changed high commissioners, dissolved the Assembly and had a new one elected. The elections were presented as a reform measure, but were construed as a referendum on independence. The Kanaka parties--the UC, the FULK (United Front for Kanaka Liberation), the PALIKA (Kanaka Liberation Party)--formed an Independence Front that garnered 34.5 percent of the votes, five-sixths of which were Kanaka votes. The Front obtained 17,243 votes and 14 seats, and the "national" parties, 29,062 votes and 22 seats (some of which also went to Kanakas numbered in their ranks).

This it is that a Kanaka was elected vice chairman of the Council of Government. All this is very skillful. The president of the republic can declare that France is respecting the New Caledonia voting, however it might have turned out, and the vice chairman of the Council of Government is sent all over the zone, and even to the United Nations, to show that the Kanakas have matters well in hand in their country.

But the majority of the Kanakas no longer expect anything from the French Republic. There has been a steady succession of incidents since that time, and notably in September 1979, on the occasion of the 126th anniversary of the taking of possession,



when there was very nearly rioting. The French flag was trampled underfoot several times, on the east coast especially. A climate of fear, exasperation and tension took hold between the communities, especially among their most highly politicized elements.

Since Summer 1979, the secretary of state has taken three types of action.

The first is aimed at reassuring the whites by developing the investment programs and the taking-on of local expenses by the state. Relieving the territorial budget of a large part of its expenses amounts to creating department status without saying so. The introduction of income tax, by way of a tax levied on very high incomes, traumatizes the white society, to be sure, but affects only a very small minority of it.

The second is "melanesian promotion," assigned to a Kanaka member of the Council of Government. For lack of time, it has been possible to assign to it only the continuation of previous operations: the FADIL (Fund for Equipping and Developing the Interior and the Islands)<sup>3</sup>, sequels to "Melanesia 2000," Institute of Melanesian Studies. Its impact is still weak.

The third is land reform, in accordance with a law recently adopted--at the end of 1980--by the Parliament. At the present time, 1,100 agricultural operators, whites or persons of mixed race, control about 420,000 hectares, whereas 12,000 Melanesian agriculturalists have 377,000 hectares of reserve lands, only 168,000 of them in Grande Terre, the most heavily populated reserve. The land reform takes account of the fact that certain reserves have become too small to support their inhabitants, and also of the fact that certain Melanesians would like to acquire nonreserve lands.

Local discussion of the proposed law was very lively. Some radical whites protested vigorously against dispossession in favor of the Kanakas. As for the Front, which usually does not take part in the ASsembly's deliberations anymore, it contented itself with a statement expressing its refusal to recognize any discussions of transfer of property on condition of its being developed unless the Feillet regulations were first repealed and the Kanakas' sovereignty affirmed over a land of which they have been despoiled. But the law is silent on this point. What is more, it assigns the carrying-out of the reform (financed by the state) to the Territory, whereas the "national parties" have never shown any initiative in this matter in the past and their white voters have no interest in it. As one sees, dialogue is more difficult than ever, once again for reasons that are less political than cultural.<sup>4</sup>

In this context, the independence of the New Hebrides (360 km away) has had a great impact. France was humiliated there. It let the white colonials down. It was Papuan soldiers who reestablished order, putting their hands on whites at times. A new Melanesian nation was born.

New Caledonian Kanakas and whites hope for or fear that the mother country's attitude will take a new tack after the 1981 presidential elections. The UC is preparing for this by working out proposals for a constitution, it is forming ties with the neighboring peoples and the decolonization committee of the United Nations, and it is examining the ways in which the land problems have been resolved in the neighboring independent archipelagoes. The moderate whites are still dreaming of a multiracial society. Others are thinking of a Rhodesia-type solution, with white independence on the whites' initiative, to which the Kanakas would be admitted on condition of their denying their cultural identity and becoming "imitation whites."

One thing seems certain: a dynamic is in operation, perhaps at the slow rhythm of the Melanesians, perhaps destined to be accelerated by external pressures. The time for decolonization and a multiracial society on the mother country's initiative seems to have passed, despite the dynamism of the Dijoud team. The violent alternative of a blood victory by one race over the other must be rejected; moreover, the neighboring countries do not want such a thing at all. Nor can a multiracial solution on the initiative of the local whites be envisioned either: their time too has passed. Might one think that a multiracial society could be born on the initiative of the Kanaka ethnic group once the time came that, with its dignity recognized, as well as its sovereignty over the land, it would no longer risk seeing its identity wiped out?

Melanesians, Wallis Islanders, Tahitians are Oceanians from a long way back. The whites of New Caledonia have become so by the work of several generations. This common Oceanic citizenship should be able to engender a Caledonian nationality from which the mother-country immigrants who arrived more recently would not be excluded.

In any case, mutual understanding among the racial groups is the only possible way to go. The mother country can help in this by ceasing to give preferential support to the whites only, and by declaring that the forces of order will prevent the whites from creating another Rhodesia. It is in the interest of France to keep friends in the Pacific.

#### The Churches in New Caledonia

It would be necessary to analyze a good many other factors also to take accurate and thorough account of the New Caledonian reality, to convey the feeling of the complexity of matters and to correct the Manichean impression that too short an account might create. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude without discussing the way the churches fit into the picture.

Protestant evangelization dates from 1840, and in 1843 Mgr Douarre set foot on Grande Terre. At the present time, Protestants and Catholics share half and half in the Melanesian world, including the Loyalty Islands, whereas in the total population, two-thirds are Catholics.

The Protestant churches (the Evangelical Church and the Free Church) are entirely Oceanian, whereas the majority in the Catholic Church are white.<sup>5</sup>

This is not the only contrast between them. Out of 80 pastors, 78 are Melanesians, the pastoral language is Huailu, and the Evangelical Church has been autonomous for 20 years. Because of this, it has been able to take a clear stand in favor of Kanaka independence, on the occasion of a synod in Summer 1979, and to receive the support of the Conference of Churches of the Pacific.<sup>6</sup>

The Catholic Church, in contrast, has not succeeded in creating an indigenous clergy. Of 60 priests, only 5 are Melanesians, and they are not all young anymore. Decolonization has not taken place. At the end of the 1960's, "analysis of the religious and political situation of New Caledonia led a group of young priests and seminarians to issue a radical challenge of the relationships of power in the ecclesiastical apparatus, as well as of the conservative ideology that prevailed in the life of the church. The confrontation resulted in the closing of the big seminary, abandonment of the ecclesiastical condition by several young priests, and the resignation of the bishop."<sup>7</sup> More recently, in 1979, the appointment of a young Marist, a mathematics



teacher and newly arrived in the Territory, as auxiliary bishop offended a good many people who thought it reasonable that he be a Melanesian.

The makeup of his church obviously prevents the bishop from taking whatever position he may choose. He therefore preaches constantly the transcendence of religion over politics and calls for union of hearts, which is slow to come, even in the church. Since the majority in this church are not Kanaka, this way of talking appears to the Kanakas as cover for a political position. Very recent times have been punctuated by graffiti on the walls of the cathedral associating the church with colonialism,<sup>8</sup> "Mass strikes," and the closing of churches in the interior.

The truth is that a strong current of secularism is flowing through all the ethnic groups. The hopes of Melanesian youth, among others, are no longer religious but political. This youth can put up with Protestant churches in which the pastorate is indigenous, young, and free to opt for independence. No matter how one looks at the situation, though, the Catholic Church is heading toward some difficult showdowns. It should be said in exoneration of its officials that a new pastoral attitude, one that would take the present facts into account, is terribly difficult to conceive and to implement. However, it cannot be put off for a long time to come without seriously compromising the future of Catholicism in New Caledonia.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. He is also responsible for the state services, which remain numerous and very expensive (secondary education is among them).
2. Jean-Marie Tjibaou: "The Kanaka's rediscovery of his identity is the condition for the future. His task is to come to grips with his inferiority complex, which is largely connected with the cultural insignificance to which he has found himself reduced." "Kanake," Editions du Pacifique, p 32.
3. The FADIL was created in 1977. It is the Melanesians' first development aid since 1853. At present it affects about 400 persons.
4. In the Parliament, regarding the land reform, the Kanaka deputy Rock Pidjot cried out: "For you, the land is merchandise, with no philosophical foundation. For me, it is the ancestral land, with which we have a mystical bond."
5. This relates to membership. Things are different in practice. An unpublished study by Mr Kohler, a researcher in the ORSTOM [Bureau of Overseas Scientific and Technical Research, brings out the fact, for example, that among the practicing religionists of the Noumea urban district, the Wallis Islanders are the most numerous (3,000 out of 7,200)!
6. This position was taken on an evangelical and not directly political basis. The text states: "The Gospel calls for support of the oppressed; this is the principal explanation of the decision." It is also based on Ephesians 4, 13.
7. Unpublished study by Mr Kohler cited above (see note 5).
8. A marvellous comeuppance. For decades, the cathedral bore the legend: "This country has been given by Mgr Douarre to God and to France."

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